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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}The explosive growth of electronic commerce has served as a catalyst for immense economic growth.[1]
Virtually every aspect of traditional commerce now has some presence on the Internet. As such, the way
people shop for clothing, cars, airline tickets, and even groceries, has been changed forever. However, these
developments may also have drawbacks. As more and more traditional brick-and-mortar stores transfer their
operations to the Internet, there are many unintended consequences. The traditional infrastructure of retail
stores may slowly begin to erode. Similarly, jobs in the retail industry may be eliminated in favor of more
efficient, more cost-effective Internet technology.
{2}Electronic commerce will also directly impact state and local governments as their tax laws are not
universally applicable to all Internet sales. Under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, [2] an out-of-state vendor
must have a physical presence in a state before the state may require it to collect sales taxes from its
customers.[3] Examples of when physical presence has been found include the presence of sales personnel,
[4] the maintenance of local retail stores, [5] and the solicitation of business by independent contractors in the
state.[6] Given the inherent nature of the Internet, this physical presence requirement essentially enables
Internet vendors to escape collection requirements in most states where they have customers. At present, the
only acceptable means by which an Internet vendor can establish physical presence is through the existence
of a warehouse, office, or employees in a given state. Operating a web site[7] or shipping goods[8] into a
state does not render an Internet vendor physically present in a state. Courts disagree as to whether
advertising is sufficient to create a physical presence within a state.[9]
{3}Since states cannot require vendors without a physical presence to collect sales tax,[10] as electronic
commerce continues to grow, state and local governments will lose an increasing percentage of their sales tax
base each year.[11] In 1999 alone, states lost $525 million in foregone sales taxes due to an inability to collect
these taxes on Internet purchases.[12] In other contexts where states cannot collect sales taxes for the
purchase of goods from out-of-state vendors, states instead seek to collect a use tax.[13] Use taxes are
"imposed upon the storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property within the state, [with]
property upon which sales tax has been paid being exempt."[14] Such taxes "put local retailers subject to the
sales tax on a competitive parity with out-of-state retailers exempt from the sales tax."[15]
{4}While the Constitution prohibits sales taxes from being assessed on purchases made outside the state's
borders,[16] use taxes may in fact be constitutionally applied to such purchases, which are then brought into
the taxing state for use or consumption. These use taxes will become increasingly more important as
electronic commerce continues to grow and fewer Internet transactions are subject to sales taxes as compared
to traditional commerce.[17] Unlike sales taxes, which are constitutionally restricted in their assessment upon
purchases,[18] the constitutional limitation upon use taxes primarily arises in their collection. An out-of-state
vendor must have a taxable nexus with the state before it can be required to collect the use tax from the
consumer and remit it to the state.[19] As in the sales tax context, that nexus only exists if the vendor has a
physical presence in the state.[20] For example, if a consumer purchases goods from either a mail-order or an
Internet company, neither of whom have a physical presence within the consumer's state of residence, a state
cannot assess a sales tax or require a vendor to collect a use tax on the state's behalf for that purchase.
{5}Because the Constitution limits a state's ability to require vendors to collect a use tax on the state's behalf,
and not the state's authority to assess the use tax on purchases used within the state, states will increasingly
assess use taxes in circumstances when a vendor lacks the physical presence sufficient for the state to require
the vendor to collect the sales or use tax. Unless the vendor voluntarily collects the use tax, [21] however, it
must be collected directly from purchasers, thus posing severe collection problems for state and local
governments. Most states do not have an effective system in place to monitor use tax obligations,[22] and
thus, the majority of Americans are not aware of their duties to pay such use taxes.[23] States would prefer
requiring out-of-state vendors to collect these use taxes from customers and then remit the revenues to the
states; since Internet vendors will rarely satisfy the physical presence standard in more than a few states, the
inherent nature of the Internet makes an already difficult collection problem virtually impossible. It is
estimated that in 2000, state and local governments may have lost as much as $9.1 billion in lost use tax
revenues, one-third of which is attributable to use taxes owed on Internet purchases.[24] By 2003, state and
local governments will lose an estimated $12.5 billion annually from lost sales taxes[25] and an additional
$20 billion annually in uncollected use taxes on Internet purchases.[26]
{6}It quickly becomes apparent that the existing tax scheme is inherently unequal in its tax treatment of
traditional commerce versus e-commerce. Taxes on traditional commerce are currently assessed and collected
more effectively than on electronic commerce, thus customers will be increasingly inclined to make their
purchases through the Internet because of the favorable tax treatment afforded to electronic commerce. This
result is inconsistent with the principle of tax neutrality, that the taxes assessed on goods not impact a
consumer's decision to purchase goods from a particular vendor through a given medium.[27] The current
system must be modified to create tax neutrality across all forms of commerce, thus treating traditional brick-
and-mortar, mail-order, and Internet vendors equally. "Ideally, tax rules would not affect economic choices
about the structure of markets and commercial activity."[28]
{7}This paper argues that the physical presence standard cannot accommodate the intricacies of electronic
commerce. Under the current legal framework, it will be impossible to achieve tax neutrality, because
Internet vendors will be able to avoid creating the physical presence that triggers tax obligations in most
states. Courts should abandon the physical presence standard in favor of the economic presence standard
adopted in other contexts.[29] Such a standard is easily applicable to e-commerce transactions and enables
states to require vendors to collect sales and use tax revenues. Alternatively, if the courts do not resolve this
issue, Congress is empowered under the Commerce Clause to legislatively overrule the physical presence
requirement and adopt a standard that restores tax neutrality to all forms of commerce. 
{8}Part II discusses the Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of the states' application of
sales and use tax requirements to out-of-state vendors. The Supreme Court has essentially required that a
vendor have a "substantial nexus" to the taxing state, and has determined that only a physical presence
satisfies that requirement in the sales and use tax contexts. However, the emergence of the Internet has
created logistical problems in applying this physical presence standard to electronic commerce, and these
issues are discussed in Part III. Finally, the efficacy of an economic presence is analyzed, and ultimately,
economic presence is suggested as an alternative to the ineffective physical presence requirement. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
{9}Two provisions of the Constitution limit states' ability to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales
taxes: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[30] and the Commerce Clause in Article I,
section 8.[31] The Constitutional tests for satisfying these provisions were established well before the
Internet became commonplace. The two most pertinent cases regarding sales and use tax collection by out-of-
state vendors, National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue[32] and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota[33], both
involved mail-order catalog companies . The Commerce Clause, particularly the negative aspects of this
clause that limit state regulation, imposes the most significant limitations on states' ability to require out-of-
state vendors to collect sales and use taxes. This Part addresses these Due Process and Commerce Clause
concerns respectively. 
A. The Due Process Clause
{10}The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."[34] The Due Process Clause "centrally
concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity."[35] When the government action at issue is a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an individual, the key question is whether the defendant had
adequate notice that his "conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."[36] Courts apply this due process analysis used in ascertaining
personal jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a state's taxing scheme under the Due Process
Clause.
1. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
{11}To establish personal jurisdiction, a party must have minimum contacts with a state "such that the
maintenance of a suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[37] Due
process may be satisfied by an out-of-state vendor who "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an
economic market in the forum State."[38] The Court has recognized:
it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,
thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are `purposefully directed'
towards residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an
absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.[39]
{12}There have been an increasing number of personal jurisdiction cases involving the Internet. In Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,[40] the court found that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can
be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
entity conducts over the Internet."[41] Additionally, in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,[42] the
court held that a company with no physical contacts in the state was subject to personal jurisdiction because
its advertising activities on the Internet and its toll-free telephone number constituted "purposeful availment."
[43] Similarly, in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson,[44] the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction was
established exclusively through Internet contacts.[45] The court "recognized the ability of the Internet to
greatly expand a company's potential market far beyond a single state's border."[46] Accordingly, the court
found the parties' Internet transactions were substantial enough to satisfy due process requirements and assert
personal jurisdiction.[47] These cases exemplify how readily courts apply existing due process jurisprudence
to the Internet, thus enabling parties to assert personal jurisdiction. 
2. Due Process and Taxation
{13}Courts have easily adapted the due process analysis for personal jurisdiction to the state taxation context.
The Due Process Clause "requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax."[48] Although the Supreme Court initially applied a physical
presence analysis in assessing the constitutionality of a state's tax machine,[49] it later moved to the more
flexible standard that now predominates in the personal jurisdiction context.
{14}In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court found that since the Missouri mail-order company did not maintain a
place of business or have any agents in Illinois, and its sole contact with the State was via the mail or
common carrier, any law requiring it to collect Illinois taxes violated the Due Process Clause.[50] 
The Court has upheld the power of a State to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to
collect a local use tax in a variety of circumstances. . . . [However,] the Court has never held that
a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only
connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.[51]
The Bellas Hess Court recognized the strong distinction it has made over the years between the physical
presence of retail outlets within a state and companies that only communicate with customers via mail or
common carrier; it found this distinction "a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it."[52] Thus, the Court
essentially required that an out-of-state vendor have a physical presence in a state before it is required to
collect taxes; the absence of such a presence would render the state's actions a violation of the Due Process
Clause.[53] As discussed below, the Court in Bellas Hess applied a similar analysis to the question of
whether the state's taxing scheme was consistent with the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.[54]
{15}Twenty-five years later in Quill, however, the Supreme Court overruled the portion of the Bellas Hess
decision that required a physical presence for due process purposes.[55] The Court recognized the evolution
of due process jurisprudence and 
[i]n that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant's `presence'
within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the
forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to
defend the suit in that State.[56]
Thus, under Quill, if an out-of-state vendor purposely avails itself of the economic benefits of the state,
physical presence is not necessary under the Due Process Clause for the vendor to be subject to the state's use
tax collection requirements.[57]
{16}Since the due process requirements were considerably weakened in Quill, primarily through the
abandonment of the bright-line physical presence requirement, due process does not pose a significant
obstacle to states implementing collection duties upon out-of-state Internet vendors.[58] The Commerce
Clause remains the primary hurdle for such state interests.
B. The Commerce Clause
{17}Once the requirements of the Due Process Clause are deemed satisfied, courts must consider the
constitutionality of state tax laws under the Commerce Clause.[59] The underlying concerns of the
Commerce Clause are distinct from those of the Due Process Clause. While the Due Process Clause is
concerned with the government treating persons fairly, the dormant Commerce Clause instead focuses on
whether a state regulation places an undue burden upon interstate commerce.[60]
{18}The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . ."[61] Courts have "consistently held this language to
contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state
taxation even where Congress has failed to legislate on the subject."[62] The Supreme Court has determined
it would "jeopardiz[e] the welfare of the Nation as a whole . . . if [states] were free to place burdens on the
flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear."[63] Thus,
while the dormant Commerce Clause permits a court to strike down unduly burdensome regulation, the
Commerce Clause itself empowers Congress to either limit[64] or expand[65] states' ability to pass laws
regulating interstate commerce. As a result, Congress can pass federal legislation enabling states to impose
taxes upon electronic commerce that would otherwise be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause.[66] 
{19}In Bellas Hess, in addition to finding that the state tax regulation violated the Due Process Clause, the
Court held that the state violated the Commerce Clause by requiring a vendor to collect use taxes from
customers when the vendor's only contacts with the state were by mail or common carrier.[67] In the twenty-
five years between the Supreme Court decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, the Court established a four-prong
test to help determine whether the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited a state's imposition of a tax upon an
out-of-state vendor. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,[68] the Court established that a tax does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause so long as the tax: "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to services provided by the State."[69] Satisfying the first prong of this test has been the primary
impediment to states' efforts to tax e-commerce. 
{20}In Quill, the major issue before the Court was whether a mail-order company with no offices or
representatives in North Dakota had a "sufficient nexus" with the state to be required to collect use taxes from
its North Dakota customers.[70] The Court recognized that, "it was not the purpose of the Commerce Clause
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing business."[71] Yet, the Court held that since Quill had no stores or representatives
in North Dakota, it did not have a physical presence within the state, and thus could not be required to collect
use taxes from North Dakota residents.[72] Despite Quill's minimum contacts with North Dakota which
satisfied due process requirements, the tax failed to satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause requirements.[73]
The Supreme Court agreed with the North Dakota Supreme Court's assessment of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as indicating a "retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in
favor of a more flexible substantive approach."[74] Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to
depart from the Bellas Hess Court's analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause issue.[75] The Court went on
to say that, "although our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more flexible balancing analyses, we
have never intimated a desire to reject all established `bright line' tests."[76] Accordingly, in Quill the Court
retained Bellas Hess's requirement that an out-of-state vendor must have a physical presence before it is
required to collect state use taxes; if that physical presence is lacking, the vendor will not have the requisite
"substantial nexus" with the state. 
{21}Courts consider numerous factors in ascertaining whether a vendor is physically present within a state to
justify imposition of sales and use tax collection requirements. The Bellas Hess Court cited the following as
indicative of a lack of physical presence: no place of business, agents or representatives, tangible property,
telephone listing, or advertising within the state.[77] In Quill, the mail-order company licensed software to its
customers in the taxing state; however, this alone did not satisfy the requisite "substantial nexus."[78] In both
Bellas Hess and Quill, the out-of-state vendor's only significant contact with the taxing state was via the
United States mail or common carrier, thus the vendors in both cases failed to establish the physical presence
necessary to constitute "substantial nexus."[79] 
{22}By separating the constitutional analyses of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, the Quill Court
invited Congress to intervene using its authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court explicitly stated
that, "while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the states and thus may authorize state
actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to regulate violations of the Due
Process Clause."[80] Thus since the two analyses were combined in Bellas Hess, any legislation Congress
would enact would be unconstitutional and violate the Due Process Clause.[81] The Court recognized that
such a decision not to enact legislation may 
have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause
prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we have put that problem to rest.
Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.[82]
The dormant Commerce Clause requirements remain the principal issues of concern to states seeking to
require out-of-state vendors to collect sales and use taxes. 
III.THE INAPPLICABILITY OF EXISTING TAX LAWS TO THE INTERNET AND E-
COMMERCE
A. Existing Law
{23}The requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses remain the primary limitations placed
upon states in their efforts to assess and collect sales and use taxes on purchases made through interstate
commerce. Quill established that the requirements of the Due Process Clause may be satisfied "irrespective of
a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State." [83] A state may reasonably impose a use tax
collection duty, consistent with the Due Process Clause, upon any out-of-state vendor that has "minimum
contacts" with the taxing State. These "minimum contacts" may be achieved by a vendor who has
"purposefully directed its activities" at the State[84] or has "engaged in continuous and widespread
solicitation of business within a State."[85]
{24}In contrast to the due process requirements redefined in Quill, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
continues to require out-of-state vendors to have a physical presence within the taxing state before the state
may constitutionally impose use tax collection duties upon the vendor.[86] The requisite physical presence
has been identified by courts as constituting sales personnel, retail stores, and solicitation of business by
agents within the state.[87]
B. The Inapplicability of Physical Presence to Internet Vendors
{25}The current definition of physical presence makes it extremely difficult for states to require vendors to
collect sales and use taxes on Internet purchases. Internet companies may generate sales without the presence
of employees or agents within a state. Similarly, their website displays their products and thus, they do not
need stores to market their products. Yet Internet purchases are analogous to mail-order sales in that tangible
purchases are delivered via the mail or common carrier, thus invoking the application of Bellas Hess and
Quill. However, it may be more difficult to ascertain the location of the point of sale in the Internet context.
Presumably the point of sale is the state to which the goods are shipped, and thus, the consumer owes sales
taxes to this state. If the Internet company has a "substantial nexus" with that state, the sales tax will be
collected at the point of sale. Otherwise, the customer will owe a use tax to the state in which the product is
consumed. This inevitably leads to questions as to how an Internet company establishes physical presence in
a state. To date, the same general standards apply to Internet companies as apply to traditional businesses.
The result is Internet vendors are virtually immune from sales and use tax collection requirements. This
physical presence requirement seems to encourage both mail-order and Internet companies alike to establish
corporate offices, warehouses, and distribution centers in the five states that do not impose sale taxes.[88]
{26}Internet purchases will become increasingly appealing to customers as many businesses will lack the
requisite tax situs in most states, and thus the sales tax will not be collected at the point of sale. States'
inability to effectively collect use taxes will enable consumers to avoid payment of such use taxes. In
fairness, while most consumers may not be aware of their use tax obligations, the resulting effect upon states
is the same--the loss of significant amounts of revenue each year.
{27}Courts have successfully applied existing laws to the world of Cyberspace in numerous non-tax
contexts, including personal jurisdiction, criminal law, and intellectual property.[89] Jack Goldsmith, a
professor at the University of Chicago Law School and scholar in the field of cyberlaw, believes existing laws
can be successfully applied to Cyberspace, although they may require some tweaking and slight adaptations.
[90] Goldsmith argues it is legitimate to apply a state's laws to those actions having an effect within that state.
[91] "The medium by which the harm is transmitted into the regulating jurisdiction be it economic
interdependence, postal mail, wind currents, or the Internet is not relevant to the justification for regulating
it."[92] Applying Goldsmith's theory in the context of e-commerce suggests that transactions should not be
immune from taxation solely because the sale is conducted through a medium distinct from that of a
traditional brick-and-mortar retailer. Bellas Hess and its progeny requiring a physical presence to satisfy the
dormant Commerce Clause are outdated and not easily applicable to mail-order and Internet sales.
Furthermore, they negate any tax neutrality between traditional, mail-order, and Internet purchases. If tax
neutrality were restored between traditional purchases and mail-order sales, it would logically follow that
Internet sales should continue to be treated the same as mail-order.
1. No Longer the Bright-Line Test the Court Envisioned
{28}In Quill, the Supreme Court seemed to retain the physical presence requirement because it perceived that
it would serve as a bright-line test. As discussed below, however, the Supreme Court's requirement of a
physical presence within a state to constitute a substantial nexus is no longer the instructive bright-line test it
was at the time of its introduction. In deciding Quill, the Court explicitly stated that "the bright-line rule of
Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce Clause."[93] In so ruling, the Court acknowledged
that: 
[l]ike other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges. . . . This
artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule firmly
establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use
taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.[94]
However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice White questioned the clarity of this bright-line test, and asserted
that "[r]easonable minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out a `physical
presence' adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax collection."[95] He suggested that "[t]he
majority clings to the physical presence rule not because of any logical relation to fairness or any economic
rationale related to principles underlying the Commerce Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience
of having a bright-line rule."[96]
{29}There are many characteristics of the Internet and electronic commerce that distinguish it from more
traditional forms of commerce and may diminish the effectiveness of this bright-line test. These differences,
such as a lack of dependence on physical location, the irrelevance of geographic borders, the absence of any
central governing entity, the ability of users to maintain anonymity, and the low cost of entry, have particular
importance in the taxation of electronic commerce.[97] These factors contribute to states' difficulty in
imposing sales and use tax collection duties upon Internet vendors as a literal physical presence can often be
avoided. Given the "dimness" of this bright-line test in its application to the Internet and e-commerce, the
Supreme Court can no longer cite the benefits of a bright-line test as a justification for upholding Quill. 
{30}The Court has frequently distinguished Commerce Clause cases on their facts from existing precedent.
[98] However, it insists that, "[a]lthough we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the
same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not
imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule."[99] Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that, "while
contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for
the first time today," it insisted that "Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent
cases."[100] The Court honored established precedent in upholding Bellas Hess' physical presence
requirement to satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause, despite significant technological advances that may
render such adherence inappropriate. 
{31}Courts may continue to limit Quill's application to sales and use taxes, or they may distinguish Internet
and e-commerce cases involving intangible property from Quill which involved tangible property.[101]
However, the end result of many lower courts distinguishing cases on the facts is that Commerce Clause
jurisprudence no longer connotes a clear answer to state taxation issues. Rather, there is divisiveness amongst
cases and scattered precedent that is often confusing and difficult to follow. As more and more states attempt
to force out-of-state Internet vendors to collect sales taxes, courts may be forced to draw additional lines of
demarcation and distinguish cases on the facts. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for
individuals and businesses alike to ascertain what taxes they may owe. 
2. Undue Burden Concerns Should Not Be a Determining Factor
{32}The policy behind the Commerce Clause, that of preventing undue burden upon interstate commerce,
continues to guide courts in determining the constitutionality of state taxing schemes. In deciding that both
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses were violated in Bellas Hess, the Court specifically mentioned the
2,300 taxing jurisdictions to which an out-of-state vendor may be subject.[102] Yet in the lower court's
decision in Quill, the North Dakota Supreme Court identified technological advances in the computer
industry as a modern means of easing the burden of compliance with various state and local taxing
jurisdictions.[103] The court declined to follow Bellas Hess because "`the tremendous social, economic,
commercial, and legal innovations' of the past quarter-century have rendered its holding `obsolete.'"[104]
However, the United States Supreme Court rejected these technological advancements as insufficient to
overcome any threatened undue burden. The Supreme Court again in Quill, as in Bellas Hess, specifically
addressed the number of taxing jurisdictions an out-of-state vendor may ultimately be subject to--over 6,000
in 1992, up from 2,300 in 1967.[105] 
{33}Today, the combination of sophisticated software and the promise of states' simplifying their tax laws
ensures that state laws requiring businesses to collect sales and use taxes will not unduly burden interstate
commerce. These developments suggest that it may be appropriate for courts to move away from the bright-
line physical presence test. Previous notions of undue burden are no longer determinative as "[t]he Internet
along with developments of software gives the taxman a set of tools that is much more powerful in obtaining
information than anything that's been used in the past."[106]
{34}Additionally, simplification of the numerous existing tax laws would help appease the courts' fears of
burdening businesses, and hence interstate commerce, with the responsibilities of collecting and paying taxes
to numerous jurisdictions. Computer software can be modified to enable both states and businesses to comply
with existing laws. Proponents of simplification argue that "[s]implification of the structure of the existing
`system' is a sine qua non of any solution to the problem,"[107] and that the real debate is whether such
simplification should be mandatory or voluntary. However, states' voluntary participation in a simplification
plan does seem to provide the kind of long-term, nationwide solution that is necessary. 
{35}Not surprisingly, the major opponents of Internet taxation are technology companies who have
undergone rapid growth and fear additional taxes will hinder future growth. "The biggest obstacle to
achieving simplification today is the belief by many Internet businesses that Congress will save them from
taxation. Ironically, technology makes simplification much more achievable, yet businesses that owe their
existence to technology deny its capabilities when it comes to taxes." [108] 
{36}Despite the objections of the technology industry, states are leading the initiative towards simplification.
From their standpoint, expending resources now to create a manageable system is in their own long-term best
interests. They anticipate it will lead to Congressional action permitting states to collect sales and use taxes
on Internet purchases. However, even among proponents of simplification, different factions are forming,
each with their own view of what form this simplification should take.[109] Thus, simplification of existing
tax laws may be too idealistic an undertaking that will not produce immediate results.
{37}Two of the reasons for Quill's retention of a physical presence standard, the ease of a bright-line test and
the prevention of an undue burden on interstate commerce, appear to be diminished by an increasingly
diverse e-commerce business and the evolution of modern technology.[110] These advances both complicate
the application of a physical presence standard to the Internet, and simultaneously, through the imposition of
software, ease concerns that existing tax laws are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.
C. Change is Necessary to Achieve Tax Neutrality
{38}Given the increasing dominance of electronic commerce, and the states' great dependence upon their
sales and use taxes as a major source of revenue,[111] imminent change in existing laws is necessary to
ensure these two competing worlds can successfully coexist.[112] The states' difficulty in imposing tax
collection duties upon out-of-state vendors is a major obstacle to creating tax neutrality. In addition, the non-
physical, intangible nature of the Internet and electronic commerce renders a physical presence standard
inapplicable to such transactions as it is difficult to identify a physical presence from most Internet
companies' operations. It is inappropriate for the infrastructure of the Internet itself to constitute physical
presence in a state. For servers may be easily rerouted through other servers, which would presumably pass
through different states, thus negating any physical presence in the original state.[113] Rendering this
physical presence would create an enormous incentive to route servers through the states which do not assess
sales or use taxes.[114] The current definition of a literal physical presence of property within the state
perpetuates existing inequalities in traditional commerce between retail and mail-order sales, and extends
these inequalities into the Internet context. Thus, courts should abandon this physical presence requirement
and adopt an economic presence standard which will enable states to collect sales and use taxes from mail
order and Internet purchasers. If the courts do not address this issue, Congress should act by legislatively
overruling this physical presence standard. Presumably Congress could restore tax neutrality to all forms of
commerce by establishing an economic presence standard that applies to brick-and mortar, mail-order, and
Internet purchases. 
1. Courts Should Abandon Physical Presence Test in Favor of Economic Presence
{39}Economic presence, defined wholly independently of any physical presence, is easily applicable to the
Internet and e-commerce.[115] An out-of-state seller's actual delivery of goods into a state would satisfy an
economic presence requirement.[116] To protect small businesses, a de minimis standard must be satisfied
before one is subject to tax collection responsibilities.[117] Factors relevant to an economic presence analysis
include the number of customers in a state, advertising in the state, and total revenues generated from the
state's residents.[118] The addition of these factors to any dormant Commerce Clause analysis appears logical
since a vendor's ability to collect and pay taxes within a state is related to its sales within the state.[119] "[A]
state's ability to collect use tax does not turn solely upon whether the remote seller maintained a physical
presence in that state."[120] Furthermore, "in today's economy, physical presence frequently has very little to
do with a transaction a State might seek to tax."[121]
i. Financial Institutions Analogy
{40}The tax treatment states assert on financial institutions may be a useful analogy in applying an economic
presence standard to e-commerce. States may tax financial institutions that have a taxable nexus within the
state, so long as such taxation does not violate the Constitution.[122] States have determined that Quill's
application is limited to sales and use taxes, and thus not applicable to financial institutions.[123] As such,
states have declined to apply a physical presence standard, instead opting for an economic presence standard.
[124] Such an economic presence focuses on all contacts with a state, particularly any "economic
exploitation" of the state's markets.[125] Economic presence is premised on the belief that the state's
infrastructure "creates and maintains the consumer market and economic climate that fosters demand for the
seller's goods and services."[126] Thus, this same standard could be successfully applied to e-commerce.
ii. Geoffrey Decision
{41}Less than a year after the United States Supreme Court decided Quill, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina heard a similar case, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n.[127] The distinguishing feature
between the two cases was the type of tax at issue. While Quill was concerned with use taxes, Geoffrey
involved state income taxes. This difference proved sufficient for the Supreme Court of South Carolina to
distinguish Geoffrey on its facts from Quill, and decline to apply Quill.[128] 
{42}Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toys R Us, Inc., had no employees or offices within South
Carolina.[129] Nonetheless, South Carolina asserted income tax liabilities on Geoffrey based upon its
intangible property within the state, specifically its trademarks, trade names, and account receivables.[130]
The court held that Geoffrey's presence satisfied due process requirements "by licensing intangibles for use in
South Carolina and receiving income in exchange for their use . . . ."[131] In its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the Court stated, "[i]t is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in
a state for income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish
nexus."[132]
{43}States have had varying responses to the Geoffrey decision. Some have legislatively adopted the
Geoffrey Doctrine,[133] others have applied the Doctrine without any enabling legislation,[134] and still
other states have rejected the Doctrine altogether.[135] This lack of uniformity erodes the predictability for
businesses engaging in interstate commerce and threatens to undermine the very purpose of the Commerce
Clause. Nonetheless, states are taking the initiative and applying an economic presence standard precisely
because existing case law is limited to sales and use taxes, and economic presence accounts for the
intangible, transient nature of electronic commerce. This discrepancy between sales and use taxes versus
income and excise taxes needs to be resolved. Presumably, the same standard should apply to each. An
economic presence standard will bring this uniformity to existing tax schemes and simultaneously, will easily
apply to the emerging electronic commerce industry.
2. If Courts Do Not Address this Issue, Congress Should Act
{44}Congress's concern about Internet taxation culminated in the enactment of the Internet Tax Freedom Act
(ITFA) in October 1998.[136] The ITFA imposed a three-year moratorium on state and local taxes on Internet
access and on any multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.[137] Since very few states
impose taxes on Internet access, a permanent moratorium on such taxes is not particularly controversial.
However, what is more problematic to most states is the provision regarding discriminatory taxes. The ITFA
defines a discriminatory tax as: "any tax imposed by a State or a political subdivision thereof on electronic
commerce that is not generally imposed and legally collectible by such State or such political subdivision on
transactions involving similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished through other means . .
. ."[138] Additionally, the ITFA provides that using an Internet access provider to create nexus for a remote
vendor constitutes a discriminatory tax.[139] Congress introduced a wide variety of bills in recent months in
efforts to find a permanent solution prior to the moratorium's expiration on October 21, 2001.[140] The bills
varied from seeking to permanently extend various aspects of the ITFA to simplifying states' tax laws to
banning the taxation of e-commerce.[141] However, no clear consensus emerged and the ITFA expired
without the enactment of any new legislation. On November 15, 2001, the Senate passed the Internet Tax
Nondiscrimination Act that extends the moratorium on Internet access taxes, and multiple discriminatory
taxes on Internet commerce, for two years.[142] The Act noticeably excludes discussion of remote sellers
collecting sales taxes on Internet purchases; this remains a critical, and contentious, issue which Congress
must address.
{45}Once courts establish precedent that explicitly involves electronic commerce, Congress may be more
likely to adopt the judicially created requirements and require their universal application on a national level.
The largest obstacle Congress faces in this pursuit is the various competing interests, all of whom will be
affected by the enactment of any legislation. Congress itself has little, if anything, to gain from enacting
legislation that permits states to effectively tax a greater percentage of transactions. Thus, one must doubt the
likelihood that Congress will pass the necessary legislation. However, a perpetuation of the status quo will
encourage states to try to expand the definition of physical presence to areas of electronic commerce, without
violating the Commerce Clause.[143] 
IV. CONCLUSION
{46}"Electronic commerce holds the potential to drastically increase the penetration of markets by out-of-
state vendors with little or no physical presence in market states."[144] Internet vendors will be free to
operate and generate revenue without incurring obligations to collect sales or use taxes from their customers.
As a result, states will lose an increasing percentage of their tax base as more business is conducted over the
Internet. The dissent in Bellas Hess notably recognized that "the volume [of sales] which . . . will be placed in
a favored position and exempted from bearing its fair burden of the collection of state taxes certainly will be
substantial, and as state sales taxes increase, this haven of immunity may well increase in size and
importance."[145] Thus, changes must be made to existing tax laws to accommodate the complexities
introduced by the emerging e-commerce industry. In the electronic commerce context, it is easier for both
states and businesses to determine an economic presence within a state than a physical one. Such an
economic presence standard would place traditional brick-and-mortar stores on a level playing field with both
their mail-order and Internet competitors, thus creating tax neutrality.[146]
{47}In Quill, Justice White questioned "the rationality of perpetuating a rule that creates an interstate tax
shelter for one form of business mail-order sellers but no countervailing advantage for its competitors. If the
Commerce Clause was intended to put businesses on an even playing field, the majority's rule is hardly a way
to achieve that goal."[147] Justice White's comments show significant foresight and his concerns have more
than materialized with the introduction of the Internet and electronic commerce. A physical presence test first
adopted in 1967 and reaffirmed in 1992 is inapplicable to an age in which transactions may be conducted
through an intangible, transient medium. Courts should reconsider this physical presence requirement and
adopt an economic presence standard that is more readily applicable to both mail-order and Internet sales. If
the courts do not act, it is within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to accept the Supreme
Court's invitation in Quill and legislatively overrule the physical presence standard.[148] It is now up to
either the courts or Congress to establish tax neutrality between traditional and electronic commerce and
enable states to collect the sales and use taxes to which they are entitled.
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Related Browsing
http://ecommercetax.com This site provides news and information about the taxation of e-commerce. It
provides practical information as well as policy.
http://www.e-tax.org.uk This site addresses e-commerce taxation from a European perspective, particularly
Great Britain.
http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/index/tax.html A site sponsored by John Marshall Law School that has articles,
cases, and statutes related to the taxation of e-commerce.
http://www.ecommercecommission.org The site of the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce
provides a compilation of reports on e-commerce issues including taxation and other policy concerns.
http://www.ntanet.org The National Tax Associations's webpage that outlines their Communications and
Electronic Commerce Tax Project.
http://www.cbpp.org/512webtax.htm The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities website provides a paper
discussing the effect of a federal moratorium on Internet commerce taxes.
Copyright 2001 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
